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ABSTRACT

The United States Air Force (USAF) issues individual weapons to aircrew members involved in combat operations. The primary purpose of these weapons is to assist downed aircrew survival efforts. This study provides a historical data base for use in determining specific survival weapon requirements for any future armed conflict in Western Europe.

Five hundred fifty-seven successful WW II evasions are included in the data base. None of these evadees actually fired a weapon for any survival purpose. However, many evadees reported situations when a weapon, properly designed for the role, would have benefited their survival.

The most frequently encountered potential use of a weapon was to kill small game or birds for food. Next, in frequency of occurrence, was the potential for psychological benefits to be gained by possession of a weapon. The third most frequently encountered potential use was for coercion. The least frequently experienced potential use was for self-defense. No situations were reported in which a weapon would have been useful for any other survival purposes.

Data from WW II was compared with current USAF survival and evasion policy. This study includes recommendations for new weapons and ammunition, and for modification of aircrew training procedures.

AIRCREW SURVIVAL WEAPON USE:

WW II DATA BASE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
ROBERT W. PENNEY, MAJ, USAF
B.B.A., Idaho State University, 1964

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1978

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Aircrew Survival Weapon Use: WW II Data Base

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to the study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

AIRCREW SURVIVAL WEAPON USE: WW II DATA BASE

BY MAJOR ROBERT M. PENNEY, USAF

The United States Air Force (USAF) issues individual weapons to aircrewmembers involved in combat operations. The primary purpose of these weapons is to assist downed aircrew survival efforts. This study provides a historical data base for use in determining specific survival weapon requirements for any future armed conflict in Western Europe.

Five hundred fifty-seven successful WW II evasions are included in the data base. None of these evadees actually fired a weapon for any survival purpose. However, many evadees reported situations when a weapon, properly designed for the role, would have benefited their survival.

The most frequently encountered potential use of a weapon was to kill small game or birds for food. Next, in frequency of occurrence, was the potential for psychological benefits to be gained by possession of a weapon. The third most frequently encountered potential use was for coercion. The least frequently experienced potential use was for self-defense. No situations were reported in which a weapon would have been useful for any other survival purposes.

Data from WW II was compared with current USAF survival and evasion policy. This study includes recommendations for new weapons and ammunition, and for modification of aircrew training procedures.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

The author's initial purpose was to determine the optimum weapon for United States Air Force (USAF) aircrew wartime survival purposes. Preliminary research revealed numerous documents pertaining to combat survival weapons. However, with one exception, all of the documents reviewed by the author were based on the unsupported assumption that self-defense against an armed enemy is the primary purpose for a survival weapon.

The exception referred to is "A Study of Personal Defense Weapons for U. S. Army Helicopter Pilots," a Master's Thesis written by Major Ray S. Leuty. In his thesis, Major Leuty notes the following deficiencies:

The commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command (CDC) has directed CDC elements to identify the requirements for personal defense weapons [PDW]... To date, however, the Aviation Agency has not been able to positively identify the PDW requirement to the extent of reducing it to writing.

The author was unable to find previous studies or documents relating specifically to personal defense weapons for helicopter pilots. Combat Developments Command records do not indicate previous complete studies on this subject. The United States Army Small Arms System Agency (SASA) has no record of related projects. SASA's PDW project director stated that one of the more frustrating aspects of the PDW project is the lack of valid documentation of historical data, especially from users in combat...(1)

Currently, USAF faces a situation similar to that confronting the United States Army in 1972 when Major Leuty completed his study. The

USAF recognizes a necessity for providing combat aircrews with survival weapons. However, no empirical data was found upon which to base a determination of the purpose(s) to be fulfilled by these weapons.

Upon detection of this void in empirical data, the author changed the purpose of this thesis.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to provide an empirical data base for use in determining requirements to be fulfilled by USAF aircrew combat survival weapons.

BACKGROUND

The USAF has provisions for issuing survival weapons to aircrew members flying in combat operations. Lacking identified requirements for survival weapons, USAF's training procedures and selection of cartridges indicate use against human targets is the primary purpose for survival weapons.

This is evidenced by use of a man-shaped silhouette target for all USAF aircrew weapons training. These targets contain no specific aiming point. Use of them increases the potential evadee's ability to hit a man-sized target, but it does little for his ability to shoot accurately enough to kill a small animal or bird.

A review of the cartridges selected for USAF's survival weapons further reinforces the observation that USAF considers use against humans to be the primary purpose for these weapons. The present USAF survival weapon is the Smith and Wesson Combat Masterpiece which fires a .38 Special cartridge. This is the same cartridge selected by a high

percentage of law enforcement agencies in the United States.⁽²⁾ Prior to the .38 Special, USAF's survival weapons were chambered for the .45 Automatic Colt Pistol (ACP) cartridge. The .45 ACP is regarded by many authorities as an excellent cartridge for use on human targets.

POTENTIAL USES

USAF aircrews, downed in enemy-held territory, continue as active participants in the on-going conflict and are known as "evadees." In his status as an evadee, the downed aircrew member is still bound by Article II of the Code of Conduct which states, "I will never surrender of my own free will..."⁽³⁾ In his research report, "American Fighting Men in Vietnam in Evadee and Escapee Status," USAF Col. Roy L. Meyers, states:

The evadee is a fighting man behind enemy lines who has been separated from friendly forces. He has the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of his fellow combatants on the friendly side of the line and is in the strictest sense, still a "soldier."⁽⁴⁾

USAF survival training stresses that the aircrew member's responsibility in an evadee status is to return to friendly control. Therefore, the potential uses to be considered for aircrew survival weapons are those likely to be encountered by evadees in their attempts to return to friendly forces. These include: self-defense, killing small animals and birds (small game) for food, stealing necessities and forcing assistance, signaling for help, marking enemy positions, and providing evadees an increased sense of security.⁽⁵⁾

IMPORTANCE

Successful return of evadees to friendly forces is important to the USAF as well as to the evadees. Recovery of downed aircrews has a

positive effect on aircrew morale. Returned evadees constitute a valuable reservoir of highly trained and experienced manpower. They are also an invaluable source of intelligence. A European Theater of Operations Military Intelligence Service memo, dated 22 October 1944, gives an insight into the significance of this source of manpower.

The publication of individual narratives of evasion and escape [E+E] was undertaken as an effective means of educating combat personnel in E+E techniques. The event has fully justified the decision since up to 10 October 1944 some 2400 men have been recovered in this theater alone.(6)

To be of maximum benefit, the evadee's weapon must be optimized for those requirements to be encountered during the evasion. Determination of potential uses impacts upon weapon and cartridge selection. This becomes apparent when some of the desirable characteristics of a self-defense weapon and cartridge are compared to those of a weapon and cartridge intended for killing small game.

Few arms authorities are willing to consider any cartridge with less muzzle energy than the .38 Special as an adequate self-defense round. Numerous Police Departments in the United States are abandoning the .38 Special in favor of more powerful cartridges due to dissatisfaction with performance of the .38 Special on human targets. At the other end of the spectrum, most hunters and survival experts feel the .22 Long Rifle cartridge is adequate for use on small game. The .22 Long Rifle cartridge destroys less meat than more powerful cartridges, makes less noise, and does not require as heavy a weapon. Cartridges for the .22 Long Rifle are approximately 23 percent as heavy as, and require approximately 22 percent as much space per round as .38 Special cartridges. (See Author's Note)

Author's Note - These are the author's measurements based upon a comparison of Federal brand .38 Special ammunition loaded with a round-nose 158 grain

Requirements for accuracy and reliability of mechanical functioning are also dictated by the intended uses of the weapon. Accuracy is partially determined by closeness of fit of the weapon's moving parts. A weapon with more closely fitting parts will normally shoot more accurately than one in which there is excess space for movement among parts. However, a weapon finely tuned for accuracy, with small tolerances and closely fitting parts, is more prone to mechanical malfunctions. This characteristic is even more pronounced when the weapon is subjected to inclement weather and is infrequently cleaned. Somewhere between the extremes of high accuracy and equally high reliability, an acceptable compromise must be established. This compromise must be based upon intended uses for the weapon.

USAF training techniques emphasize the ability to place bullets in a man's upper torso rather than concentrating on a specific organ, such as the heart. Comparing the size of a man's upper torso, the target for self-defense, and the size of a squirrel, a possible target for a meat-hunting evadee, it is apparent that accuracy requirements for a self-defense weapon are not as great as for a weapon used to kill small game.

Conversely, the requirement for functional reliability is greater in a self-defense weapon. If the squirrel in the above example is missed by the first shot, it will in all probability run away before a second aimed shot can be fired. If the man was missed, only slightly wounded or had a comrade, the evadee may well require rapid follow-on shots. Additionally, the consequences of inability to accomplish follow-on shots

bullet and Super X brand .22 caliber ammunition loaded with a 40 grain round-base bullet.

are more immediate for the man faced with a self-defense situation than for a man trying to find a meal.

LIMITATIONS

Present USAF policy is to procure, train with, and issue one model and caliber weapon for worldwide aircrew use. To establish a data base for probable worldwide uses would require research and resources beyond the scope of this paper.

This study will examine requirements for an aircrew survival weapon in Europe. In terms of men and equipment, USAF's largest current overseas commitment is to the European Theater. This force is capable of a large scale of operations but it's potential adversary possesses a large and capable air-defense network. These factors foretell many potential evasion experiences for USAF aircrews in any future armed conflicts in this theater.

To determine potential areas of USAF operations in a future European conflict, the author selected a war-gaming scenario from the United States Army Command and General Staff College. The scenario selected was "First Battle"; this scenario is used in course P 313, Forward Deployed Force Operations (European Setting). In this scenario, Russian and Warsaw Pact forces attack in the Central Army Group region of West Germany. The U. S. division being exercised is the 23rd Armored Division. This division's mission is to establish a covering force along the international border, defend its assigned territory in sector, and retain the town of Alsfeld, West Germany.⁽⁷⁾ Thus, the 23rd Armored Division may, if necessary, withdraw approximately 45 kilometers into West Germany without failing in its assigned mission. From this scenario, it is

apparent that USAF aircrews have the potential for becoming evadees in occupied territory of "Western Bloc Nations" as well as those nations currently behind the "Iron Curtain."

This study will investigate the evasion situation faced in occupied land of Western Europe. Experience gained in World War II (WW II) leads to the conclusion that evadees in invaded Western European nations may expect significant assistance from civilian residents of the invaded nations. However, no such assurance exists for evadees in Eastern European nations. Therefore, the evasion situation faced by evadees in Western European nations may be significantly different from that faced by evadees in the east. Large quantities of evasion data from WW II* do not permit thorough evaluation of both evasion situations within the time available.

ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made:

1. Future armed conflicts in the European theater will be the result of a Russian or Warsaw Pact invasion of a Western Bloc country or countries. This assumption is substantiated in the book, Dropshot, which is taken from a declassified United States plan for war with the Soviet Union.⁽⁸⁾

2. Citizens of the invaded country(ies) will, upon request, provide USAF evadees with assistance similar to that experienced by U. S. Army aircrews in France, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark during WW II.

*This data is located at the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

3. Small game (wild and domestic) existed in sufficient quantities, during WW II, to offer evadees the opportunity to provide themselves with food by hunting.

ORGANIZATION

Chapter II includes a determination of what constitutes a potential use of a survival weapon and a method of compiling the data.

Chapter III summarizes the significant data determined by this study. A complete data bank is found in Appendix II.

Chapter IV compares the summarized data from Chapter III to current USAF survival doctrine. It includes an evaluation of the purposes to be fulfilled by a survival weapon within the limitations imposed on this study. It also includes recommendations for future study.

CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

¹Ray S. Leuty, "A Study of Personal Defense Weapons for U. S. Army Helicopter Pilots" (unpublished Master's thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, 1972), pp. 2-3.

²George Nonte, "The Policeman and His Handgun," Pistol & Revolver Guide (Chicago, Illinois: Follett Publishing Company, 1970), p. 163.

³Department of Defense, Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, The U. S. Fighting Man's Code, DOD Pam 1-16, [1959], p. III.

⁴Roy L. Meyers, "American Fighting Man in Vietnam in Evadee and Escapee Status" (unpublished research report number 3802, Air War College, June 1969), p. 2.

⁵Leuty, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

⁶Taken from 22 October 1944 memo from Headquarters European Theater of Operations P/W and X Detachment, Military Intelligence Service, recorded on microfilm roll A1319 stored at the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

⁷U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Forward Deployed Force Operations (European Setting), Course P 313," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas [School Year 1977-78]), p. 14-III-3.

⁸Anthony C. Brown, Dropshot (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1978), p. 136.

CHAPTER II

THE STUDY

OVERVIEW

The author has used historical data of United States Army aircrew evadees in France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark during WW II. The time frame covered by these reports is from 26 September 1942 through 31 August 1944. This historical data was retrieved from microfilmed records of successful aircrew evadee debriefs. Three of these debriefs have been included and are found in Appendix I, SAMPLE EVADEE DEBRIEFS, beginning on page 38. It is recommended that these debriefs be read at this time to increase reader understanding of the data presented in this study.

This thesis will concentrate on the positive study of success (successful evasion) rather than on the negative study of capture.

Data from returned Prisoners of War (POWs) was not used for two reasons. First, returned POWs, who felt they did not make an adequate attempt at evasion, may not have disclosed all the pertinent facts of their capture. Secondly, debriefs were frequently not sufficiently detailed to permit adequate evaluation of the capture situation. For example, statements such as "I was discovered and captured by enemy soldiers," imply a potential use for the aircrew weapon in a self-defense role. This implication may be valid if the evadee was captured by two enemy soldiers while in a defensible position with a good escape route, but is not valid if a company-sized force captured him while he was asleep.

Records of U. S. Army Air Force evadees have been studied exclusively. This is due to a similarity between the roles of WW II U. S. Army aviators and current USAF aviators. These roles are Close Air Support, Interdiction, Air Superiority, Tactical and Strategic Reconnaissance and Strategic Bombing. Inclusion of other nation's or other U. S. service's evadees' experiences could change the results of this study due to dissimilar mission types and areas of operation.

Numerous evadee debriefings were not sufficiently detailed to allow a determination of why evadees decided upon their selected course of action in each evasion experience. Therefore, it was necessary to draw conclusions about the potential use of a weapon. For example, when an evadee was hiding with other evadees and enemy soldiers sighted and captured part of the group, the potential was determined to have existed for use of a weapon for self-defense. Some evadees reported being sighted and identified by enemy soldiers who either made an unsuccessful attempt or made no attempt to capture them. In these instances, a determination was made that a potential use for self-defense existed.

Evadees are constantly in danger of being captured, wounded, or killed; these ever-present hazards result in significant mental stress. As the level of stress is increased, the probability of rational actions being replaced by emotional reactions increases. Possession of a weapon offers an increase in one's sense-of-security during high-stress situations,⁽¹⁾ thus decreasing the probability of excessive emotional reactions. This study recognized a psychological need for a weapon each time an evadee expressed an unusually high anxiety level or expressed the fear that detection by the enemy was imminent. This need for a weapon was also determined to exist each time an evadee was recognized by an enemy soldier.

Several statements by evadees made it clear that they considered it risky to contact civilians for assistance. However, deliberate contacts were made on numerous occasions. These contacts were made in an effort to obtain food, water, clothing, or medical assistance. Many of these contacts were successful with no threats or display of force necessary. However, evadees were occasionally turned away by frightened or unfriendly civilians. This study recognizes the potential use of a weapon for coercion during these unsuccessful contacts. A series of contacts to fulfill a single need, such as hunger, was determined to represent only one such requirement for a weapon, as use of a weapon on the first contact would have eliminated that need.

Medical authorities recognize a significant requirement for food in excess of that needed to prevent starvation. In his book, A Textbook of Aviation Physiology, J. A. Gillies states, "Exercises which simulated survival experiences have taken place... A prominent feature of such exercises is the great comfort and benefit to morale and fortitude which a man gains from acceptable food..."⁽²⁾ Evasion experiences of WW II verify this observation. The author studied records of 369 evasions which lasted at least 2 days. On the second day in hostile territory, 15% of these evadees risked capture by contacting at least one civilian for food. This need to supplement food gained from foraging is one which could be fulfilled, at least in part, by use of a weapon to kill small game for food. This study recognizes a potential use for a weapon to kill small game for each occasion in which an evadee contacted the civilian populace for food. A series of contacts for one meal is considered as only one requirement for this use of a weapon.

The potential exists for use of a survival weapon as a signalling

device to draw the attention of friendly forces to the evadee's position. A similar potential use is identifying enemy positions with tracer ammunition (marking) for friendly forces. None of the studied evadees reported any situation in which a weapon would have been beneficial in either of these roles. Therefore, this study contains no empirical data for either of these potential uses.

METHODOLOGY

World War II records for this study were provided by the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Two rolls of microfilm were used that contained approximately 1,000 individual evasion debriefs. All sufficiently detailed debriefs were analyzed and included in the data base presented in this thesis. Each evasion was analyzed day-by-day for actual or potential uses of a survival weapon. The day each crewmember arrived in enemy territory was considered as a full day regardless of the actual time of the occurrence. Evasion debriefs are not sufficiently detailed to permit any more detailed breakdown of time.

As each debrief was studied, a line entry was made on an Evadee Data Sheet (Appendix II) reflecting data pertinent to actual or potential weapon use. Data was retrieved manually from all Evadee Data Sheets and is presented in Chapter III. Evasions were considered to be completed when the evadees were accepted by evasion assistance groups. The exceptions referred to include only information pertaining to physical difficulties experienced while crossing the Pyrenees Mountains. Secondly a

study of assisted evasion would require classification of this thesis and thus result in restrictions on its availability to potential readers. Lastly, after an evadee is accepted by an evasion assistance group, he may be rearmed and no longer must rely solely on his issued survival weapon.

Much of USAF's guidance, applicable to evasion, is contained in AFM 200-3, JOINT WORLDWIDE EVASION AND ESCAPE MANUAL, which is classified SECRET. The author has avoided an evaluation of classified guidance to prevent classification of this study; thus, making the study available to a greater audience. However, in accomplishing the research, nothing was disclosed which detracts, in any way, from the guidance in AFM 200-3.

CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

¹George Nonte, "Handguns at War," Pistol & Revolver Guide (Chicago, Illinois: Follett Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 172-3.

²J. A. Gillies, A Textbook of Aviation Physiology (New York: Pergamon Press, 1965), p. 502.

CHAPTER III

SUMMARIZED DATA

FACTORS BEARING ON THE DATA

Only one evadee reported firing his survival weapon in hostile territory. That evadee, 1st Lt. Clyden D. Bell, fired at the fuel tanks of his crash-landed aircraft in an attempt to burn the aircraft.⁽¹⁾ Thus, the sole actual firing of a weapon was not included in the data compiled in this study as it was not the result of a survival requirement.

An undetermined number of evadees included in this study did not possess survival weapons. No reasons for this lack of armament were given. Five evadees, who had weapons, disposed of them soon after beginning their evasions. Three of these weapons were given to local civilians; the other two were buried. No reasons could be determined for these actions.

This disregard for the survival weapon may be due to inadequate survival training. No evadee reported having received any survival training other than briefings by Wing or Group staff officers. Some evadees, shot down early in their tour, had received no survival training.

Evadee comments indicate survival briefings stressed that any contact with civilians involved some risk of capture, but that remote farm houses offered the best probability for a successful contact.

Despite the potential hazards, most evadees made contacts with area residents. Many evadees lived with these residents for periods of time ranging from 1 to 74 days. Civilians harboring evadees provided

for all of their physical necessities.

Few evadees completed their evasions without civilian assistance. The majority of evadees were introduced by local residents to members of underground groups. These groups then arranged and assisted evadee travel to Spain. In Spain, evadees were turned over to U. S. authorities.

THE DATA

Data compiled on potential weapon uses is presented in Tables 1 through 4. In reading approximately 1000 evadee debriefs, the author has drawn some conclusions relating to the statistical data presented in these tables. Author's conclusions will follow the appropriate tables and will be included in paragraphs titled Discussion. These personal observations are not intended to modify the empirical data. They are included solely to make available any insight gained by the studying of each evadee debrief.

Killing Small Game

The most frequently experienced potential use of a survival weapon was for killing small game for food. Table 1 presents the potential uses of a weapon for this purpose. (See Table 1, Page 18)

Observations. The percentage of evadees staying with area residents increased steadily from approximately 19% on the third day of evasion to approximately 94% on the fifteenth day. Therefore, the percentage of evadees providing their own food decreased daily.

A high percentage of evadee food requirements came from potentially hazardous contacts with local residents. The sixth day of evasion will be used to illustrate this point. Approximately 27% of the evadees received food from people they were staying with on this day. Eight percent

Table 1

Weapon Requirements for Killing Small Game

<u>Day of Evasion</u>	<u># of Evadees</u>	<u>Potential Uses</u>	<u>Potential Uses/Evadee</u>
1	557	27	0.048
2	369	54	0.146
3	242	33	0.136
4	159	17	0.107
5	107	16	0.150
6	74	6	0.081
7	56	3	0.054
8	49	5	0.102
9	43	5	0.116
10	36	4	0.111
11	27	3	0.111
12	22	1	0.045
13	19	1	0.053
*			
17	16	1	0.062
19	16	1	0.062
26	9	1	0.111
28	9	1	0.111

*No requirement for use of a weapon to kill small game existed on any day not included in Table 1. The last potential for this use of a weapon occurred on the twenty-eighth day of evasion.

gained food by contacting civilians specifically for that purpose, and 29% were given food by civilians they had contacted for other purposes. Four percent provided their own food, and the remaining 12% went without food. Thus on the sixth day of evasion, 84% of all evadees gained food through the civilian populace.

To refresh the reader's memory, the method of determining potential uses for a weapon to kill small game is restated. The potential for this use of a weapon is recognized for each occasion in which an evadee contacted the civilian populace expressly for food. However, a series of contacts for one meal is considered as only one requirement for this use of a weapon. One hundred seventy-nine such potential uses were documented. However, this figure does not tell the complete story. As a result of unsuccessful contacts for food, an additional twenty-one contacts were made. Therefore, use of a weapon for this purpose would have prevented up to 200 potentially hazardous contacts for food.

Discussion. The sixth day of evasion will again be used as the basis for a comparison. On this day, 56 evadees received their food from civilians while staying in their homes or as a result of contacts not specifically for the purpose of gaining food. The remaining 18 evadees were responsible for 6 contacts for the purpose of gaining food. This means 33% of evadees not otherwise reliant upon civilians for food experienced a potential need for a weapon to kill game for food. Applying this 33% requirement to the 56 evadees who relied upon civilian-provided food, one realizes the probable addition of 18 potential uses of a weapon to kill game if the evadees included in this study had avoided civilian contacts.

Psychological Benefit

The next most frequently experienced potential use of a weapon was for psychological benefit. Data relating to this use is presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Weapon Requirements for Psychological Benefit

<u>Day of Evasion</u>	<u># of Evadees</u>	<u>Potential Uses</u>	<u>Potential Uses/Evadee</u>
1	557	42	0.075
2	369	9	0.024
3	242	6	0.024
4	159	1	0.006
5	107	1	0.009
6	74	1	0.014
7	56	1	0.018
*			
13	19	1	0.053

Observations. The majority of U. S. aviators in WW II were caucasian. Therefore, they physically resembled residents of the area included in this study. As a result of this similarity, evadees were more difficult to distinguish from area residents than they would have been in areas where this similarity did not exist. Many evadees took steps such as wearing civilian clothing to increase this resemblance. Several went so far as to walk in a manner they described as the "French peasant shuffle." Fluency in one or more of the areas languages assisted some in completing this deception.

The high frequency of evadees staying with local residents

*No requirement for a weapon to provide psychological benefit existed on any day not included in Table 2. The last potential for this use of a weapon occurred on the thirteenth day.

significantly affected this potential use for a weapon. While staying with civilians, evadees neither traveled nor had to supply their own food. Therefore, exposure to the enemy was decreased. Approximately 19% of all evadees were so sheltered on the third day of evasion. This figure increased to approximately 47% on the sixth day and remained above 70% from the eleventh through the thirtieth days of evasion.

Discussion. Two factors are responsible for the significantly greater rate of occurrence on the first day of evasion. First, enemy soldiers frequently were able to determine where evadees had landed by sighting parachutes or watching aircraft crashland. Therefore, they knew where to search and could search more effectively than on succeeding days after evadees had traveled from their points of landing.

Secondly, evadee movements on the day of arrival in hostile territory were less deliberate than on succeeding days. This was generally due to a desire to depart the area before the arrival of search parties. As a result of the less deliberate movement, encounters occurred which might otherwise have been avoided.

Coercion

The third most frequently encountered potential use for a weapon was for coercion. These potential uses are found in Table 3. (See Table 3, Page 22)

Observations. The high percentage of evadees residing with local civilians kept these figures lower than they would have been if evadees had been more self-supporting.

Forty-five potential cases of weapon use for coercion were documented. This figure does not reflect the increased exposure incurred by

Table 3
Weapon Requirements for Coercion

<u>Days of Evasion</u>	<u># of Evadees</u>	<u>Potential Uses</u>	<u>Potential Uses/Evadee</u>
1	557	16	0.029
2	369	11	0.030
3	242	8	0.033
4	159	4	0.025
*			
6	74	2	0.027
10	36	2	0.056
11	27	1	0.037
13	19	1	0.053

*No requirements existed for this use of a weapon on any day not included in Table 3. The last potential for this use of a weapon occurred on the 13th day of evasion.

aircrews in subsequent attempts to gain the refused items or services. If a weapon had been used in each of the initial unsuccessful contacts, 28 follow-on contacts would have been avoided.

Discussion. Evadee debriefs were not always sufficiently detailed to allow a determination of the location of these opportunities for use of a weapon relative to enemy soldiers or other potentially dangerous groups. However, the majority of these situations clearly occurred in relatively remote areas which offered evadees an opportunity for escape in the event coerced individuals sought assistance. No incidents could be determined to have occurred in an area where escape would have been unlikely.

Self-Defense

The least frequently encountered potential use of a weapon was for self-defense. Data on potential self-defense uses is located in Table 4.

Table 4

Weapon Requirements for Self-Defense

<u>Day of Evasion</u>	<u># of Evadees</u>	<u>Potential Uses</u>	<u>Potential Uses/Evadee</u>
1	557	18	0.032
2	369	3	0.008
3	242	2	0.008
*			
5	107	1	0.009
6	74	1	0.014
13	19	1	0.052

Observations. Factors influencing the potential use of a weapon

*No requirement for use of a weapon in self-defense occurred on any day not included in Table 4. The last potential for this use of a weapon occurred on the thirteenth day of evasion.

in self-defense are the same as those affecting psychological benefit to be gained from a weapon. These are summarized below.

Most U. S. Army aviators of WW II physically resembled area residents. Therefore, enemy soldiers were handicapped in identification of evadees.

Many evadees were taken into the homes of area residents. While in homes, evadees were not traveling or searching for food. Therefore, they were not as susceptible to enemy detection as they would have been if they were traveling and providing for their physical necessities.

Discussion. Two factors caused the significantly higher rate of occurrence on the first day. First, enemy soldiers were frequently able to determine where to search by watching parachute descents or observing aircraft crashland.


Secondly, evadees movements were usually less deliberate on the first day of evasion than on succeeding days. This was attributed to a desire to depart the immediate area before search parties arrived. This less deliberate movement resulted in encounters which might have been avoided during more deliberate movement.

Graph 1 combines the data provided in Tables 1 through 4. (See Graph 1)

Discussion. Inconsistencies occurring after the seventh day of evasion are due to the small number of evadees remaining after that date. With the small sample on days seven through thirteen, a single potential requirement for a weapon appears as a large frequency of occurrence.

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Graph I
Potential Weapon Requirements/Evadee



LEGEND:

- Psychological Benefit
- o——o Killing Game for Food
- - - Stealing/Forcing Assistance (Coercion)
- . . . Self-defense

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

¹Taken From E & E REPORT NO. 298, EVASION IN DENMARK, recorded on microfilm roll A1319 stored at the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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CHAPTER IV

CURRENT APPLICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EVASION

Air Force Manual (AFM) 64-3, SURVIVAL, defines a hostile area as, "...one where any individual that becomes aware of your presence can bring about an end to your survival."⁽¹⁾ It further states, "Unless specifically briefed to do so, no attempt should be made to contact any member of the civilian population of a hostile area."⁽²⁾

This guidance makes it clear that USAF evadees must make every effort to remain self-sufficient until they have found friendly forces or traveled out of the hostile area. Evadee self-sufficiency includes accomplishment of such requirements as food gathering, medical aid, and shelter.

The following starkly worded message is found in EVASION AND RECOVERY, an instructor's handbook prepared by the staff of USAF's Aircrew Survival School. "DON'T BE SEEN! People are found near villages, roads, and bodies of water. People catch evadees."⁽³⁾ Evadees, therefore, should make every effort to avoid being seen by anyone and to prevent or erase all evidence of their existence.⁽⁴⁾ (See Author's Note)

Author's Note - The instructor's handbook, EVASION AND RECOVERY, is For Official Use Only. Permission for use of the included reference was received in a 12 April 1978 letter from Hq. 3636th Combat Crew Training Wing/DO.

The above guidance will significantly alter any future evasion experiences within enemy-occupied areas in Western Europe. Instead of deliberately seeking out civilians to provide the necessities of life, future evadees will be avoiding civilians and providing for their own necessities.

The majority of food, consumed by evadees included in this study, was procured from civilians. Current evasion policy requires evadees to avoid this food source and to provide their own food. Therefore, evadees in the future must provide much more food for themselves than did these WW II evadees. This requirement for more evadee-provided food may be partially fulfilled by increasing the amount of rations in aircrew survival kits. However, it will also be necessary to exploit other sources of food.

One method of acquiring additional food is use of a survival weapon to kill small game. The USAF policy concerning this use of a weapon is, "The practice of hunting in hostile territory must be generally discouraged..."⁽⁵⁾ However, killing small game with a weapon appears to invite less risk of exposure than deliberate contact with civilians. This observation is corroborated by the previously quoted warning, "Unless specifically briefed to do so, no attempt should be made to contact any member of the civilian population of a hostile area."⁽⁶⁾

It was previously determined that the greatest number of potential uses for a weapon was for killing small game for food. With increased reliance upon evadee-provided food, this potential use will occur more frequently in any future non-nuclear conflict in this area of Europe.

One method of forecasting the future potential for this use of a weapon in a non-nuclear environment is to determine the total number of times evadees, not staying in local homes, received food from civilians.

This figure is the number of food sources to be replaced by the same number of future evadees following current USAF evasion policy. It is also the number of occasions an equal number of future evadees may have the potential to assist their evasions by shooting small game for food.

Evadees experienced 1380 days of evasion in which they were not staying in civilians homes. During these 1380 days, they received food from civilians 957 times. Thus, the potential for this use of a weapon in any future European conflict could be expected to occur once every 1.4 days ($1380 \div 957$).

It is significant to note that the above figure does not allow for any increase in evadee use of other available food sources. This includes sources such as edible wild plants, aircrew-carried survival rations, or stealing crops from gardens.

No historical data base was found upon which to base a forecast of increased evadee use of the above mentioned food sources. For this reason, 1 potential use for every 1.4 days of evasion will be used as a "maximum potential use rate." A "minimum potential use rate" will also be used. This will be the number of days of evasion not spent in a civilian house divided by the number of potential uses for a weapon to kill small game. The minimum potential use rate is 1 potential use for each 7.7 days of evasion ($1380 \div 179$).

Evadees may also use their survival weapons to kill small game for food in a nuclear conflict. As stated in AFM 64-3, "Even though animals may not be free from radioactive materials, they can and in survival must be used as a food source..."^(?) However, this source of food will likely be considerably diminished. Again quoting from AFM 64-3, "...most of the wild animals living in a fallout area are likely to become sick or die

from radiation during the first month following the nuclear explosion."

A potential coercive use rate can be computed using the same reasoning as was used above. Disregarding days spent in civilian homes, evadees experienced 45 opportunities to use a weapon for coercion during 844 days of evasion. This equates to 1 potential use every 18.8 days ($844 \div 45$).

Decreased reliance on civilians would result in a decrease in the frequency of potential use of a weapon to coerce. No historical data is available from European combat to indicate the extent of this potential decrease.

Coercive use of a weapon is undesirable in the environment considered for this study. This use of a weapon may transform an initially sympathetic civilian populace into a hostile one. Therefore, the end result of coercion in this environment may be more negative than positive.

The author was unable to locate any USAF publication addressing evadee use of a weapon for coercion. However, this use of a weapon is considered, by the author, to be a violation of USAF guidance to avoid contact with residents of the hostile area.

Requirements for use of a weapon for self-defense can be divided into two time frames. The first of these being the initial day of evasion. The 557 evadees studied experienced 18 opportunities for use of a weapon in self-defense on the first day of evasion. Therefore, the rate of occurrence for this use of a weapon on the first day of evasion was once every 30 days ($557 \div 18$). Modern surveillance methods, such as radar, may facilitate more rapid and precise enemy determination of the location where future evadees begin their evasion. If this occurs, evadees may be expected to experience a higher frequency of requirement for this use

of a weapon on the first day of evasion.

The second time frame referred to above is all days subsequent to the first day. No potential uses for a weapon for self-defense were reported by any evadee while staying in a civilian house. One potential use occurred as a result of a request for assistance from a civilian. The remaining 7 potential uses, after the first day of evasion, occurred while evadees were hiding or traveling in accordance with current USAF evasion policy.

The total number of days spent evading, disregarding the first day of evasion, was 1489. Of these, evadees stayed in civilian homes 645 days leaving 844 days spent in an evasion status similar to that set forth in current USAF evasion policy. All 7 potential uses for a weapon for self-defense, identified above, occurred during these 844 days of evasion. Therefore, when evasions were being conducted similarly to those prescribed by current USAF policy, the potential requirement for use of a weapon in self-defense occurred once every 126.3 days ($844 \div 7$). This figure offers a valid planning factor for future conflicts in a similar locale, but, should be weighted by expected enemy density in the evasion area.

Potential use of a weapon to gain psychological benefit was influenced by the same factors as those which affected potential use for self-defense. On the first day of evasion, evadees experienced the potential for psychological benefit at a rate of 1 use every 13.3 days ($557 \div 42$). This figure could be expected to be higher in future conflicts due to enemy use of electronic surveillance gear.

After the first day, evadees experienced 844 days of evasion in conditions similar to those currently recommended by USAF. These days of

evasion resulted in 20 occasions when possession of a weapon would have offered psychological benefit. Thus, after the first day of evasion, this potential use of a weapon occurred once every 42.2 days ($844 \div 20$). This is a valid planning factor for any future European conflict but should be weighted by expected enemy density in the evasion area.

A significant change to the evasion situation has occurred since WW II. This change is a result of the current use of helicopters in rescuing downed aircrews. Communications procedures for these rescue efforts are detailed in AFR 64-3, WARTIME SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) PROCEDURES. This regulation specifies that radio equipment is the primary means of evadee communication with SAR forces.⁽⁹⁾ However, evadee carried radios may fail or be lost.

If SAR aircraft are in sight, the evadee may be able to make his position known to these aircraft by use of visual signaling devices.⁽¹⁰⁾ Signal mirrors and day and night flares are carried and normally used for this purpose. However, tracer ammunition fired from a survival weapon may also be used as a signaling device. No historical data exists for this use of a survival weapon in Europe as rescue helicopters were not used during WW II. Although it cannot be quantified historically, this potential use of a survival weapon must be given some consideration.

CONCLUSIONS

Based upon historical data and current USAF evasion policy, the predominant potential use for an aircrew survival weapon in enemy-occupied Western European nations is to kill small game for food. The maximum potential use rate for this requirement was determined to be 1 use for each 1.4 days of evasion. Even the minimum potential use rate of 1 for each

7.7 days of evasion far surpasses any other foreseen survival weapon use.

The next most frequent potential use for a weapon is for psychological benefit. This potential use is anticipated to occur at the rate of 1 every 13.3 days for the first day of evasion and 1 every 42.2 days for subsequent days of evasion. The rate for the first day may require an upward adjustment due to electronic surveillance gear. Both rates may be adjusted upward or downward based upon the estimated density of enemy soldiers.

Self-defense is the last quantifiable potential use of a survival weapon. Its frequency of occurrence, 1 every 30 days for the first day and 1 every 126.3 days for succeeding days, may require the same adjustments as recommended for psychological uses.

The weapon's potential for use in coercion and signaling must also be considered. However, they do not rate consideration as "primary purposes" for the survival weapon.

SUMMARY

Experience gained during WW II indicates that the most frequently encountered wartime use for an aircrew survival weapon in Western Europe is for killing small game to eat, not for self-defense. Present USAF aircrew survival weapons and ammunition are not optimized for killing small game. Training of aircrews does not adequately prepare them for the potential survival needs to be encountered in Western Europe.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made:

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1. That USAF procure, for use in Western Europe, an aircrew survival weapon optimized for killing small game.
2. That USAF procure, for use in Western Europe, ammunition optimized for killing small game.
3. That USAF aircrew survival weapons training include firing at targets designed to increase accuracy sufficiently to allow aircrews to reliably hit small game targets.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This study has addressed one of the potential areas of conflict. It is in the best interests of the USAF and its aircrew members to have survival weapons and training optimized for all potential areas of conflict. Therefore, the following recommendations are made:

1. That studies be made of aircrew weapon requirements during the Korean and Southeast Asian conflicts and from areas of combat in WW II not included in this study.
2. That studies be made of anticipated aircrew weapon requirements in areas of potential conflict for which no historical data exists. This includes, but is not limited to, Africa, the South American continent, and the Middle East.
3. That a study be made of evader food requirements. This study would be beneficial in determination of elements to be included in aircrew survival kits. Data included in Appendix II may be useful in accomplishing this study.

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CHAPTER IV

ENDNOTES

¹Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, Survival-Training Edition, AFM 64-3, 15 August 1969, ch. 1, p. 5.

²Ibid.

³Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, 3636th Cmbt. Crew Tng. Wg. (ATC), Evasion and Recovery (FOUO), S-V80-A-EH-IH, 15 February 1977, ch. 6, p. 23.

⁴Ibid., ch. 6, p. 24.

⁵Department of the Air Force, Survival-Training Edition, op. cit., ch. 2, p. 44.

⁶Department of the Air Force, Evasion and Recovery (FOUO), loc. cit.

⁷Department of the Air Force, Survival-Training Edition, op. cit., ch. 8, p. 12.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Department of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy, Air Force/XOOT-B, Wartime Search and Rescue (SAR) Procedures, AFR 64-3, 30 November 1971, p. 6.

¹⁰Ibid.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

SAMPLE EVADEE DEBRIEFS

HQ, ETOUSA
OFFICE OF AC OF S, G-2
MIS DETACHMENT

20 April 1943

E & E REPORT NO. 25.
EVASION FROM FRANCE

Arrived in U. K.:
17 April 1943

0-430620, Capt. John L. Ryan,
367 Bomber Squadron, 306 Bomber Group.

AGE: 26
LENGTH OF SERVICE: 2 yrs.
PEACETIME PROFESSION: School teacher. (taught French)
PRIVATE ADDRESS: 546 Eighth Avenue
Troy, N.Y.

OTHER MEMBERS OF CREW

PILOT		NARRATOR		
CO-PILOT	0-661870	1st Lt. Gerald L. Simmons		(Killed)
NAVIGATOR	0-660491	1st Lt. Robert B. Hermann		(Prisoner)
BOMBARDIER	0-661003	1st Lt. James Laine		(Prisoner)
TOP TURRET	17032540	T/Sgt. Glen A. Blakemore		(Landed Safely)
RADIO OPERATOR	11009583	T/Sgt. Charles E. Perry		(Prisoner)
BALL TURRET	18058542	Sgt. James C. Greene, Jr.		(Prisoner)
WAIST GUNNER	18081398	S/Sgt. John R. Chapman		(Prisoner)
WAIST GUNNER	15082521	S/Sgt. Robert G. Muman		(Prisoner)
TAIL GUNNER	15099498	S/Sgt. William H. Forrester		(Prisoner)

6 MARCH 1943 We left THURLEIGH at 0945 hrs on 6 March 1943 to bomb
LORRIENT. The flak was intense as we approached the target
at 23,000 ft. One burst knocked out our No. 3 engine and
DAMAGED BY cut out my engine controls. I could not feather the No. 3
FLAK prop and the engine set up a terrific vibration. We had
been hit just before unloading our bombs on the target.

We made a left turn off the target and flew about
30 miles out to sea in formation. The No. 3 engine
vibrated about 6 inches, shook off the cowlings and then the
prop flew off. It hit the side of the fuselage, knocking
out the windshields. The Co-pilot's face was badly cut.
We started dropping behind. Capt. DRAPER, leading the
lower element, slid up under me and passed me. I realized
that it was impossible to get back to ENGLAND. The engines
were running wide open. We could not keep up and were

doing 2100 RPM's and about 41 inches. My gas was insufficient to get back at that power setting. We made a right turn out of formation and headed in for the QUIMPER Peninsula.

The plane started to let down immediately. Our speed picked up and I lowered the wheels to slow us down. After giving the warning signal I told the crew not to jump until we had crossed the coast and to wait until I told them.

GUILVENEC

We crossed the coast at 4,000 ft. over GUILVENEC.

ATTACKED BY
FIGHTERS

I waited until we were at least two miles inland before giving the order to abandon ship. Before the order we were attacked twice by F. W.'s. One was from the rear which I did not see and the other came in at 1100 hours. The second one was shot down by Sgt. BLAKEMORE, top turret gunner. The fighter went into the sea. The French saw this and told me about it.

ABANDONS SHIP

We started bailing out at 3,500 ft. while travelling at 220 m.p.h. The top turret gunner went out first and I was out last. I put the ship on the automatic pilot and it held fairly steady. Before jumping I went into the nose which was empty, back past the cockpit where I twisted the knob on the automatic pilot to down position. The air speed had risen to 240 m.p.h. I found no one in the radio compartment and could see that the main entrance door was off. I went back to the bomb bay and jumped. Before leaving the cockpit I had destroyed the I.F.F. and I believe the bomb sight was thrown into the ocean. My jump was at 1430 hrs.

ST. JEAN-
TROLIMAN

When the chute opened my left arm got tangled in the main straps and was jerked up my back and over my head. (It was discovered upon his return that Capt. Ryan's arm had been broken near the shoulder). Because of the low altitude jump I was down quickly. I landed on my shoulder and passed out. The landing was made in a pasture about 10 ft. from a road and a mile from St. JEAN-TROLIMAN. There were about 40 Frenchmen surrounding me when I regained consciousness. A woman helped me out of my chute. I asked about the Germans and was told they were in the town. Immediately I was shown the best direction in which to run. The French buried my chute.

I was in a small valley and started running West. When I came to a stream I walked in the water for an hour before resting. I took a benzadrine tablet and filled my water bottle and continued to walk until 1750 hrs. For a hiding place I found some brush in the corner of a field and covered myself in it. I remained hidden here until 2100 hrs. After eating some of the chocolate and malted

milk tablets (See Author's Note 1) and drinking most of my water I walked for about 300 yds. to a farm and asked for food. I approached a man and boy in a barn and told them who I was. They gave me milk, bread and butter (See Author's Note 2) and told me the Germans had captured seven of my crew and that one was dead. I did not ask for help here because it seemed too near the area of search. With the aid of my compass I walked S. W. until 2430 hrs., but when this brought me in sight of the ocean I changed my direction to North. Finally I found a haystack. My arm was hurting too badly to climb up on it so I slept at the bottom. When I woke up I felt feverish.

At 0700 hrs. I went across the road to a farmhouse. There was a Frenchman and a 13 yr. old boy in the house. After talking to them they gave me coffee, bread and soup. (See Author's Note 3) They also gave me cake and bread to take away. After sitting by their fire for an hour I started walking North keeping close to the hedgerows. At 1200 hours having found a field of heavy brush, I made a bed and lay in the sun to get warm. I ate more bread and chocolate before falling asleep. About 1300 hrs. a Frenchman awakened me. I was still wearing my uniform (pinks, leather flying jacket). He asked me about myself and when I said, "An American parachutist" he was very friendly. He took his knife and cut off my insignia. Then he told me to stay where I was, hidden, until he went after food. In an hour he was back again with a friend and some food (wine, a bowl of stew, 5 raw eggs and bread and butter). (See Author's Note 4) They stayed with me for about 30 minutes but before leaving said they would come back for me that evening and hide me in their stable. They were back again at 2100 hrs. We went to their stable and they said they thought they might find help for me. At 0030 hrs. they awakened me to say friends were with them.

Author's Notes

¹This resulted in an entry in "Self-gained Food" for the first day of evasion.

²This resulted in an entry in "Requested Food" for the first day of evasion.

³This resulted in an entry in "Other Contacts Food" for the second day of evasion.

⁴This resulted in an entry in "Other Contacts Food" for the second day of evasion.

8 MARCH 1943

HELPER'S
EFFORTS
FAIL

The friends were two men who brought civilian clothes and wooden shoes. I gave my passport pictures to one of the men who was to try getting an identity card for me. After they left I slept until 0530 hrs. when the farmer came in and told me to hide in the field that day. At 2100 hrs. the friend who was trying to get the identity card returned. He was discouraged because his effort had failed. My pictures were given back to me and after we had eaten (See Author's Note 1) I was told that since suspicion had been aroused it would be best for me to go further for help.

10 MARCH 1943

One friend who came said he thought he knew someone who could help me. At 1300 hrs. a farm hand walked with me to a wood about 3 miles away where we met the friend. He took me another 2 miles deep in the forest where I waited while he went off to talk to the supposed helper. In a half-hour they both joined me and after talking for a few minutes the rest of my journey was arranged for me.

F. P. TOMPKINS
Colonel, GSC
Acting AC of S, G-2

Author's Notes

¹This resulted in an entry in "Other Contacts Food" for the third day of evasion.

HQ, ETOUSA
Office of AC of S, G-2
MIS Detachment

21 June 1943

E & E REPORT NO. 36
EVASION IN FRANCE

2d Lt. Joseph L. Wehheuer, O-732687
365 Bomber Squadron, 305 Bomber Group

MIA: 13 May 1943
Arrived Spain,
2 June 1943
Arrived Gibraltar,
13 June 1943
Arrived UK,
17 June 1943

AGE: 27
LENGTH OF SERVICE: 1 Year 5 Months
HOME ADDRESS: 435 N. Lucerne Blvd.
Los Angeles, California

OTHER MEMBERS OF CREW:

PILOT	C-791494 1st Lt. M. C. Pierce
CO-PILOT	C-733596 2d Lt. A. W. Borlen
NAVIGATOR	O-732766 2d Lt. R. T. Ramsaur
BOMBARDIER	Narrator
RADIO OPERATOR	32264844 T/Sgt. A. J. Brandt (In hospital at
ENGINEER	38068892 T/Sgt. R. E. Olbert DOULLENS broken leg)
BALL TURRET GUNNER	37449902 S/Sgt. T. S. Tharp
WAIST GUNNER	18155214 S/Sgt. C. R. Damirez
WAIST GUNNER	11033848 S/Sgt. R. J. Vertefeuille
TAIL GUNNER	39531335 S/Sgt. K. E. Brooks

May 13, 1943

ATTACKED BY
ENEMY
FIGHTERS

We left Chelveston the morning of May 13, 1943. Our target was MEULTE. There was very light flak as we approached the target. We made our run on the target, dropped our bombs and turned to start back. A large number of fighters attacked us. The first burst of fire set our plane on fire. The fire started just behind the nose, beneath where the pilot and co-pilot sit. I put on my parachute and then tried to put out the fire. I then released my oxygen mask and inter-phone communication.

The Navigator released the escape hatch and as he crawled forward I followed him. At this time the plane was in a spin. I was knocked unconscious by the explosion that blew away part of the nose of the ship and the next I remember, I was out of the ship floating toward the ground. While still only about half conscious, I pulled my rip cord and the chute opened. I must have been at about 20,000 feet altitude. I saw parts of the ship and the life raft coming down. I also saw two chutes which I believe were from my plane. I could see the English Channel and the coast of England.

I landed in a fairly large tree, breaking four or five branches before reaching the ground. I released my chute straps as the chute was caught in the tree. I also took off my winter flying jacket and boots. Five French people had gathered to greet me when I landed and they took my equipment. I asked (by means of a little French and sign language) a girl where Germans were. She pointed in one direction indicating the Germans and then pointed to the woods and motioned for me to go there. I told her to make dresses from the parachute and started for the woods. I went over two high fences and reached the woods which were only about fifty feet away.

My clothing consisted of summer flying suit, woolen sweater, O. D. shirt and brown low cut shoes. After walking for about five minutes, I hid my flying suit in a rotted tree trunk. I then changed my course and after walking another four or five minutes I hid my sweater under some leaves and put all of my insignia in my pocket.

APPROACHES
ROAD
WORKERS

After walking a short while I came to a road where a group of peasants were working. I hid and after listening and observing them for some time, I decided they were all French peasants. I remembered from the lectures we had been given that we were to go to the poorer French people for help. I whistled and one of them looked around. When I motioned for him to come to me he came but only after looking all around to be sure he was not being watched.

He asked if I were English. I said, "No, American and indicated that I had come down in a parachute. I asked him about my clothes and he said they were no good. We then went back to the woods and after sending a boy for clothing, brought me cider and bread. (See Author's Note 1) We heard a lorry coming so the Frenchman motioned me back to the woods. I hid in a gully and watched the road. The lorry stopped and a group of German soldiers got out and questioned the Frenchman. They did not see me but apparently being satisfied with what the French told them they went back in the lorry and drove on.

The Frenchman returned with a complete change of clothing and 100 Francs for me. I changed and the Frenchman hid my clothes in a culvert. I stayed in the woods five hours during which time several people came to see me. About nine-thirty that evening two passed close to me but did not see me.

Author's Notes

¹This resulted in an entry in "Other Contacts Food" for the first day of evasion.

SECURES
AID

After it became dark, I walked across several fields and met a girl who motioned for me to follow her. I did so and in a few minutes we met two boys. We went to a farm house where there were four or five older people. They fed me (See Author's Note 1) and one lady treated the wounds in my legs and bandaged them. I spent the night in their barn.

May 14, 1943

I spent the day in a field away from the farm house and when returning to the house that evening I was asked if I wanted to see a doctor. I said, "Yes." A doctor, his wife and the Bourgemaster of the town nearby came and took me away in an ambulance. (See Author's Note 2) We went to a small village and I spent the night outside the village with a well-to-do farmer.

From here on my journey was arranged for me.

Compiled by:
R. R. Nelson
Major, AC

Approved by:
W. S. Holt
Lt. Col., AC
Commanding

Author's Notes

¹This resulted in an entry in "Other Contacts Food" for the first day of evasion.

²This resulted in an entry in "Injury Assistance" for the second day of evasion.

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
P/W and X Detachment
Military Intelligence Service

10 April 1944

E & E REPORT NO. 413
EVASION IN FRANCE

Donald W. HANSLIK, 2d Lt. 0-739094

715 Bomb Squadron, 448 Bomb Group

TARGET: LUDWIGSHAVEN
MIA: 30 December 1943
Arrived in U.K.
24 March 1944

MEMBERS OF CREW: (This information checked with PWIB)

PILOT	0-741894	2d Lt.	Thomas A. FOSTER	MIA
CO-PILOT	0687768	2d Lt.	Francis G. ROGERS	MIA
NAVIGATOR	0-736627	2d Lt.	Paul E. DAILEY	MIA
BOMBARDIER	0-739094	2d Lt.	Donald W. HANSLIK	NARRATOR
RADIO OPERATOR	13029830	Sgt.	Harold G. STRAUGN	MIA
TOP TURRET GUNNER	35741985	T/Sgt.	James N. BRANDT	MIA
BALL TURRET GUNNER	38425993	S/Sgt.	Billy C. POLLARD	MIA
WAIST GUNNER	33253298	S/Sgt.	Charles F. HIPPS	MIA
WAIST GUNNER	36553040	S/Sgt.	Chester W. JANECKO	MIA
TAIL GUNNER	36604398	S/Sgt.	Humberto F. OSTARELLO	MIA

BLOWN OUT
OF PLANE
BY
EXPLOSION

Fifteen minutes from the French coast, returning from target, we were attacked by five FW 190's. There was a fire in the nose and another in the waist, and then an explosion somewhere around the cockpit or bomb-bay knocked me to the floor. The ship went into a spin. I had buckled on my chute when another explosion blew me out. The next thing I knew I was in the air hanging by one hook; the other had broken. All this occurred around 19,000 feet. A life raft and the rudder of a B-17 fell past me. During my fall the chute kept spilling because only one hook was fastened and I could not control its swinging and twisting motion.

WARNED OF
GERMANS

I landed on my back, unhurt, in a field and got to my feet as a Frenchman ran up to me. I asked if he was French. He nodded and wanted to know if I wasn't American. When I said yes he pointed to a wood about fifty feet away and, in broken English, told me that the Germans were coming.

SPENDS NIGHT
IN
UNDERBRUSH

I left my chute for the Frenchman to hide and ran into the wood. I kept a fast pace as long as I could stand it and stopped only after I had stumbled upon a well-hidden woodpile where I thought I could rest safely for a while. I stayed there until sundown when the sounds of people approaching drove me further into the wood, and I spent the night in the underbrush.

I was without food all the next morning and though surrounded by woodchoppers I was afraid to approach them because they were working in parties. I stayed in the bushes all day watching the woodchoppers and waiting for an opportunity - which never came - of going to one of them alone. I remained hidden where I was all that night.

FOUND AND
RECOGNIZED BY
WOODCHOPPER

In mid-morning of the next day one of the woodchoppers stumbled upon me from the rear and recognized me at once. He indicated by gestures that I should follow him quietly and led me to a clearing in the underbrush where we could not be overheard. There I pointed out that I had no shoes and could not travel far and that I was hungry. He motioned me to stay where he had hidden me.

At noon a young farmer, the one I had first met, arrived with an overcoat, rubber boots and food. (See Author's Note 1) I explained that I wanted to find some one who could help me get out of France and was told that arrangements had been made for a man to visit me in the wood that night.

BOTHERED BY
FRIENDLY DOGS

He warned me that about forty Germans were searching the neighborhood and that I must hide carefully that afternoon in the brush. My greatest worry was the woodchoppers' dogs, for occasionally they found me and barked or returned time and time again to stand over me.

After dark my French helper brought a man to see me who spoke broken English, and my journey was arranged from that point.

Compiled by

JOHN F. WHITE, JR.
Capt, AC

Approved by

W. S. HOLT
Lt. Col. AC
Commanding

Author's Note

1

This resulted in an entry in "Other Contacts Food" for the third day of evasion.

APPENDIX II

EVADEE DATA SHEETS

EVADÉE DATA SHEETS

Data was input into the EVADÉE DATA SHEETS in coded form to facilitate ease of retrieval. An explanation of the column titles and coded entries follows.

Report Number. Report number is the "E & E REPORT NO." which identifies each individual evasion report on the microfilm rolls.

Injured. The letter Y in this column indicates the evadee was injured sufficiently to cause him to seek medical aid from civilians during his evasion.

Injury Assistance. Entries reflect attempts by the evadee to obtain medical aid from the local populace.

Self-gained food. Self-gained food is all food obtained from sources other than direct contact with civilians. This includes such sources as food stolen from farmers fields and survival rations carried by aircrews.

Other Contacts Food. This includes food given or sold to evadees by local residents as a result of unavoidable contacts or contacts for a purpose other than gaining food.

Requested Food. Entries represent deliberate contacts with civilians for the primary purpose of gaining food.

Self-defense. This column includes all opportunities for use of a weapon in self-defense.

Psychological Benefits. These entries represent occasions when evadees experienced an increased threat to their freedom and would have

received psychological benefit from possession of a weapon.

Other Contacts. These are deliberate contacts with civilians for a purpose other than gaining food. Only contacts for items which could have been obtained by coercion are included.

Days of Evasion. Days of evasion is the total number of days the evadee spent in evasion status. This includes the day he became an evadee and the day he was accepted by the underground or made his own way into Spain.

Remarks. This column includes comments relating to evadee use or disposition of a survival weapon.

General. Coded entries consist of numbers alone and combinations of numbers and letters. Numbers alone are found in columns titled "Self-gained Food," "Other Contacts Food," "Self-defense," and "Psychological Benefits." Each number indicates the day of evasion on which that particular event occurred.

Columns titled "Injury Assistance," "Requested Food," and "Other Contacts" contain numbers and letters. In each column, the first character in the entry is a number. This number indicates the day of evasion on which the event took place. Following that number is the letter Y or N. The letter Y indicates that the requested item or assistance was provided; the letter N indicates that it was not.

Columns titled "Requested Food" and "Other Contacts" contain a third entry for each contact. In the "Requested Food" column, this entry is a number. This is the number of days since the evadee's last food from any source. The third entry in the "Other Contacts" column is a letter. This letter indicates for what purpose the contact was made. The letter C means the contact was made for civilian clothing, W. indicates the contact

was for a drink of water or for drinking water to be carried by the evadee.

All entries for some evadees will not fit on one line in the EVADEE DATA SHEET. When necessary, entries are continued on succeeding lines. Therefore, all entries on lines which do not have a Report Number are attributed to the last previously listed Report Number.

Entries pertaining to all evadees are presented, within each column, in the sequence in which they occurred. Some entries in the "Self-gained Food" column consist of a number followed by a dash and another number. This entry indicates the evadee stayed in a civilian home from the first date through the last date and all of his physical necessities were provided by his host(s).

A sample EVADEE DATA SHEET follows. This sample is included to assist in reader understanding only; all entries are fictitious. The remarks column has been deleted as no coded entries are included in this column. Each column has been lettered. These letters identify the columns being discussed in subsequent similarly lettered paragraphs.

SAMPLE EVADEE DATA SHEET

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion
1	y	1n,3y	1,3,4	1,1,4-10	2n1,2y1, 3n0	2,3	2,3, 4	1nc lyc lyw	10

Interpretation of this example is as follows:

a, b, and c. The evasion is identified as E & E REPORT NO. 1 on the microfilm roll. This evadee was injured and made one unsuccessful contact to obtain medical aid on his first day of evasion. He again sought medical aid on his third day of evasion; this contact was successful.

d and e. The evadee provided food for himself on the first, third, and fourth days of evasion. He received food from civilians twice on the first day of evasion and stayed in a civilian home from the fourth through the tenth day of evasion. While staying in the home, all necessary food was provided by the person or persons with whom he was staying. None of these sources of food were the result of a contact for the purpose of obtaining food.

f. On the second day of evasion, he made two deliberate contacts for the purpose of obtaining food. The first of these contacts was unsuccessful; the second was successful. His last food, prior to these contacts, had occurred the previous day. The evadee made another unsuccessful contact for food on the third day of evasion. He had eaten on the third day prior to this unsuccessful contact.

g and h. The evadee had potential uses for a weapon for Self-defense and Psychological Benefits on the second and third days of evasion. He experienced an additional opportunity for Psychological Benefit on the fourth day.

i and j. Two contacts were made for civilian clothes on the first day of evasion. The initial contact was unsuccessful; the second was successful. A successful contact for water also occurred on the first day of evasion. This evasion lasted ten days.

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
7									10	
8				1,2,4-10					4	
9				3,4					4	
10				3,4					9	
11				1,2-9		1	1		1	
12				1					1	
13				1					1	
14				1,1,2,3,4,5,8,9,10	7y2				11	
15				1,2,3,4,5					5	
16				1,1,2,3,4,5				lyw	5	
17				1,1,2,3,4,5				lyw	5	
18	y	ly		1,1					2	
19				1,3-8,9-20	2y1				20	
23				1,1,2,3,4,5,6	5y0	5	5		6	
24				1,2,2,3,4,5					5	
25			1	2,2,3	1y0				5	
26				1					1	
27			1	2-73					74	
28				1,2,3-11					11	
31				4,5,6					6	
32				4,5,6					6	
33				1					2	
36	y	2y		1,1					3	
37				1					1	
38				1,4,5-13	3y2, 3y2				14	
39	y	1y		2,2,2	1n0				2	

EVADÉE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
40			2	1,1,2,3	3n0, 3y0, 5y1				4	
41				3,4					5	
42				1					3	
43				1					3	
44				1,3	2y1, 4n1, 4y1, 6n2, 6n2, 6n2, 6y2			1yw	7	
45				2-21	1y0				21	
46			1	1,2-10					10	
47			1		2y1				4	
48				1,2,3,3,6-9	5y2				9	
49			1	1,2,3,3,6-9	5y2				9	
50				1,1,2,2,3,4					5	
51	y	1y		1,2-31					31	
52		1	1						2	
53		1							2	
57				2	2n1, 2n1, 2y1				3	
58				1,3,4,5					6	
59				2,3,4					4	
60				1					2	
61				2	4y2				2	
63				1,2,5,6,7					5	
69									7	
70									1	
71									2	
73				3,4,5-28	2y1				1	
74									28	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
75				2,4	5y1				5	
76				1					1	
77				1					1	
78									1	
79									1	
80	y	ly							1	
81				3,4,5					5	
82				3,4,5					5	
83									1	
84	y	ly						2yw	1	
86			1,2	3,3			1		3	
87				1					1	
91				1-6					6	
92			2	1	2y1				2	
93									4	
94									3	
95									1	
100									2	
101									1	
102				2	1y0				3	
104	y	ly							1	
105									1	
106				2					3	
107			1	2		3	1,3		3	
108	y	ly	1			3	1,3		1	
109			1						1	
110			1						1	

EVADÉE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
111									1	
112				1,1,2,3,4,5					5	
113				1-30					30	
114				1,2,3					2	
117	y	ly		1					3	
118				2,2,3,4					1	
119				3,4	2y1				4	
124				1	2y1				4	
125				1,1,2					2	
126			1,2,2	3,4-6					2	
129			1,2,3,4	6,7	5y1				2	
130				1		1	1		8	Drew weapon in self-defense
131				1,1			4		2	
132			1,1,9	2,3,3,3,3,7,9,9	2y0,5y2,6y1,8y1,9y1				10	
133			2	2,3	3y1			3nc, 3nc	3	
135										
136				1		1	1		1	Drew weapon in self-defense
137									1	
138				1					1	
163				2,2					2	
165				2,2					3	
166				1					1	
169				2					3	
172	y	ly	2						1	
173									1	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
175									1	
176				1,2-5					5	
179				1,2-6					9	
180				2					3	
182			1	2					2	
184				1,2					2	
187									1	
188									1	
190				1					1	
191				1					1	
195			1	2					3	
202			2,3	5,6,7	8y1			4y1	6	
203			1	1,2-4,6				6y1	9	
204			2	3-25					25	
205			2	3-25					25	
206				1,2,2					3	
207			2		3y1				4	
208				1,2					2	
210	y	1y		1,2,3					2	
211			1,2	2					2	
212				1,2-4					4	
213									1	
215									1	
216			1	1,2,3	1n0				3	
217					1n0				1	
218				1,1,2,3					1	
219				1					1	

EVADÉE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
220				2,2,3	2n0, 3y1				3	
221				2,2,3	2n0, 3y1				3	
222				2,3,3,4			3,3	2yw	4	
223			1	2					1	
225	y	ly							2	
227									1	
228	y	ly		1					1	
231				1,2,3					1	
232				1,1,2,3					3	
233			1,1	3,3					4	
234									1	
237	y	ly	1	1			1		1	
238				1					2	
240									1	
241				1					1	
242				1					1	
243				1			1		2	
244			2	2,2					3	
245	y	ly, 4y		1,1,3,4-21					21	
247				1,2					2	
249				1					1	
250				1					1	
252				1					2	
253				2			1		2	
254	y	ly			1y0				1	
255			2	2			1	2yc	2	
256									1	

EVADÉE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
257				1					1	
260				1,2					2	
261				2					2	
262				1-37					37	
263				1					2	
264	y	ly							2	
265									1	
270				2				lyw	2	
273				1,1,2-4					4	
274				1,1,2-4					4	
275				2-21				2yw	21	
276	y	2y		2-5,6,7		1	1		7	
277					1y0, 3n2, 3y2				3	
278	y	ly		1,1			3	2nw, 2nw, 2yw	2	
279				1,2,3,3					3	
281				1					1	
282				1			1		1	
283	y	ly		1,2,3					3	
284	y	5y		1-5					5	
288			2	1-5			1		5	
289			1	1					2	
290				1					1	
291				1					1	
292			2,2	2					3	
293	y	4y	2,2,3,3	4-6					6	

EVADER DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
294				1-4					4	
295			1	1					2	
296				1,2,2					2	
297				1		1	1		1	
298				2,3,3					4	
299			1,2,3,4	1,2	4n0,4y0				4	
300				1,2					2	
301				1,2			1		2	
302			3,4,5	1,2,4,7-12	6y1				12	
303				1,1-9					9	
304				1-5					6	
306	y	ly	1	2,2					2	
309				1,1,1			1		1	
310				1,2,3					3	
312									1	
314				3	2y1		1		4	
317			1,2,2,3,7,8	1,4,4,5,6,7,8					10	
321			9							
322			2	1					1	
324	y	ly		4,4					4	
325				1					1	
327	y	ly		1					1	
328	y	4y	3	2,3,4,4,4		1	1	4yw	6	
330	y	ly					1		2	
331				1					2	
332				1					1	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
333			2,2,2,3,6	2,6	1y0,3y1,5y2			lnc	6	
334			2,2,2,3,6	2,5	1y0,3y1,5y2			lnc	6	
335				1,2,4,5,6,6,6,7,8,8,9,10,10	3y1,8y1,9y1,10y0			10yc	10	
336				1,2,4,5,6,6,6,7,8,8,9,10,10	3y1,8y1,9y1,10y0			10yc	10	
337				1,2,4,5,6,6,6,7,8,8,9,10,10	3y1,8y1,9y1,10y0			10yc	10	
338	y	ly		1-8					8	
339				1-9,9,10,10				10nw, 10nw, 10yw	10	
340			2,2	2		1	1		1	Drew weapon in self-defense
341			1	2,3	2y0	1	1		2	
343			2	2,2,3,3,3					3	
346									4	
347				3	2y0				1	
348									3	
349									1	
350									1	
351				1					1	
352	y	ly		1,2					2	
353									1	
354				1-4					4	
355				2,2					2	
356			2	2,3					4	
362	y	2y	1,2	1,2					2	Buried his weapon

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
363				1					1	
364				1					1	
365				1					1	
367				1,2,3,4	2y1				1	
370			4	2,2,2					5	
371			1	1,4,5,6,6,7					2	
372	y	ly		1,4,5,6,6,7					8	
373			3,4	1,4,5,6,6,7					4	
375				2,2,3,4					1	
376			1,2,6	3,3,4,7		6	1	3yw, 3yw, 3yw, 4yw, 6yw	1	
377									8	
378				1					1	
379								2yw	1	
380			1,2						1	
381									2	
382									1	
383			1,3		3y2, 3y0, 4y1, 5y1		3		2	
385									5	
386	y	ly				1	1	2yw	2	
387			1						2	
388				1,2,2					1	
389	y	ly, 2y		2					4	
									3	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
390									1	
392									1	
393			1	1,1					1	
394			2	3	3y2	1	1		1	
395			1	2					1	
396			1	1,2,2,3,4,5		2	1,2		5	
397			2		3y1				3	
398			1	1,2,3					3	
399			1	1,2,3					3	
400			1	1,2,3					3	
401				1,2,3					3	
402				2,2					2	
403									2	
404									2	
405									2	
406									2	
409				1,1					2	
411			4	2,3,3	2y1,4y1				1	
412				2,3,6,7,8,9,11,12	2y1,5y2,6y1,7y1,10y1		2,2	5y	12	
413				3					3	
414	y	1y		1-4					4	
415				1,1,2					2	
416									1	
417	y	2y,2y	1,1	1,2,2			1		3	
419			1	1					1	
420			1	1					1	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
421	y	ly		1-3,4-6			1		6	
422				1,3					4	
423				1					1	
424				1					1	
425				1,2					2	
426				1,2					2	
427				1,2					2	
428	y	ly		1,2,2,3					3	
429			2	2					2	
430	y	ly		1	1n0		1		2	
431				2					3	
432			1	1,1					3	
433						1	1	2yc	2	
435			2	1					4	
436			1	1,3					3	
437			1	1,2,3					3	
438	y	ly		1					1	
439				1,2	2y0, 3n1, 3n2, 3y1				4	
440				1,2	2y0, 3n1, 3n2, 3y1				4	
444				1,2,2-8					8	
445				1-4					4	
446				2					2	
447				1,2-4					4	
448				2-5					5	
646				6,7,8,9,10,11,12	2y1, 3y1, 4y1		7		13	

EVADERS DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
450			1,2	3,4,5,6,8	2y1				9	
452			1,2,3,4,5,6 7,8,9,10,11 12		12y0				12	
454				1					1	
456				1					1	
457				1					1	
458				1,2,3					1	
459									1	
460									1	
461									1	
462			1,2	3,3					1	
463				1,2-5					1	
464				1-5					1	
465				1,1					1	
466	y	2y		2					2	
467				1					2	
469				1,2,3,4,5,5	7y2			2y	2	
470			2	3					2	
471	y	1y		1-7					2	
472				1					2	
473				1					2	
474				1,1					2	
475				1,2,2,3,3,4					4	
476				1,2,2,3,3,4					4	
477				1,2,3,4					4	
479				1,2,2,3	3y0		2		3	

EVADER DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
480				2,2	2y0				3	
481				1	1y0				1	
482									1	
484			1						1	
485				2					2	
486				1					1	
487				1					1	
488		ly		1,1					1	
489	y								1	
490									1	
491				1					1	
492				1					1	
493				1,2,2,3,3,4					4	
494				1,2,2,3,3,4	1y0				4	
495				1,2,2,3,3,4	1y0		2		4	
496				2,2,2,3,4					4	
497				1,3	2y1			lyw	4	Gave weapon away
498	y	ly,3y		1,2,3					3	Gave weapon away
499									1	
500									1	
501	y	ly							1	
503				1,2,3					4	
505				1,1					2	
507	y	ly							1	
508									1	
509									1	
510				2					2	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
511				2					2	
512				2					2	
514				1			1		3	
515				1,2					3	
517				1,2					3	
518				1,2					3	
520				3					2	
521				3					3	
522			2		2/1				3	
523	y	2y			3/1				3	
527				1,1,2	2/1				2	
528				1,1					2	
530				1					2	
531					1n0				2	
533				1					1	
535	y	1y		1-5					5	
536			2,3,4	5				5yn	5	
537				1			1		2	
538				1			1		2	
539									1	
540									1	
545				1,2					4	
546				4					4	
550					2,1,4y2				4	
553				2,3,4					1	
556									4	
557				1					2	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
558				1					1	
564				1,2,3					2	
567				1,2,3					3	
568				1,2,3					3	
571									1	
572							1		3	
573							1		3	
574							1		3	
576									1	
577									1	
582				3					3	
586				1					1	
587				1					1	
588				1					1	
589				1					1	
590				1					1	
591				1					1	
592				1					1	
593				1					1	
594				1					1	
595				1					1	
607				1					2	
614				1-10					10	
617				2					2	Buried his weapon
620									1	
627									1	
628				1					3	

EVADÉE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
629				1				lnc	3	
635									1	
636									1	
637	y	ly							1	
639			1	2, 3, 3, 4					2	
654				2					1	
655				1					5	
660									2	
663								2nw, 2yw	1	
664				2					2	
665				1					1	
666									1	
670									1	
671				3, 4, 4	2y1, 2y0, 3y0				4	
672				1					1	
676								lyc	1	
679				1, 2, 3, 4, 5					5	
680				1, 2, 3					3	
681									1	
682				1					1	
692	2								1	
693				3	ly0, 2y1, 4y1, 6n2, 6y2			2yc	7	
695						1	1		2	
696									1	
697									1	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
700					2n1, 2n1, 2y1, 3n1, 3y1, 4y1, 5y1	2	2		6	
702									1	
707				1	2y1, 3y1				5	
708				1	2y1, 3y1				5	
710									3	
711									2	
712									2	
717				2, 3	2y1			2yc, 2yw, 3yc, 3yw, 1yc	2	
718									3	
719				1, 2					2	
720					1y0				1	
721	y	ln, ly		1					1	
722				2					2	
723				3					3	
727				2	2y1			3yw	4	
728			1						2	
729				1, 2				1yc	3	
730	y	ly							2	
731				1, 2					1	
732				1, 2					1	
733				1			1		2	
735									2	Gave weapon away

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
736				1					1	
737				1,2,2,2	2y1			lnw	2	
739				1,3,3,4,4	2y1			lnw	4	
740	1			1,3,3,4,4	2y1			lnw	4	
741	1			1,3,3,4	2y1			lnw	4	
742	1			1,3,3,4	2y1			lnw	4	
743				1,3,3,4	2y1			lnw	4	
744				1,1					1	
745				1					1	
746				2,3	1y0				1	
747				1					3	
748				1					1	
753	y	2y	2,3	1,6,7,10,18,24,25,29,30	4y1,5y1,9y2,11y1,13n2,17y4,19y1,26y1,28y2	13	13	2yc, 10nc, 11nc, 13yc	33	
754									2	
755	y	1y	2						1	
756				3	2y1,2n0,2y0,2n0,3y0				3	
757				3,3,5	1y0,2y1,3y0				7	
761				2,2	2y1				3	
764									1	
765				3	2y1,2n0,4y1,4y0,4n0			2nc, 5yc	5	
766				1					1	
767				1					1	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
775			4	1,2,2,4				lyc, lyw, 2yc	5	
778			8,9,10	4	2y1,3y1,1ly1				11	
779			8,9,10	4	2y1,3y1,1ly1				11	
780				5,6	3y2,4y1			3yc	6	
792					2y1				3	
794									2	
799									1	
800				2	4y2,5y1,6y1				6	
802				2,3	1y0				3	
805				1					2	
806				1	1n0				2	
807					1y0,2y1			2yc	2	
810									2	
813				2					2	
818									1	
819				1,2	3y1				3	
820									1	
821									1	
822									1	
824				1	2n1,2n1	1	1		2	
825									1	
827				2			1		2	
828				3			2	2yw	2	
829		1		5	3y2,4y1,5y1				3	
830									5	

EVADEE DATA SHEET

Report Number	Injured	Injury Assistance	Self-gained Food	Other Contacts Food	Requested Food	Self-defense	Psychological Benefits	Other Contacts	Days of Evasion	Remarks
831				5	3y2, 4y1, 5y1				5	
832				1			1		2	
833				1					2	
835									1	
842			1, 2, 4				2		4	
843									2	
844									2	
845									2	
846									1	
847	y	ly		1					1	
850	y	ly							1	
851									1	
853				1-11					11	
864				2-15	1n3, 1y0				15	
868			1	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-33	2y1				33	
869						1, 2	1, 2		5	
870				1, 2, 3, 4				lyw	4	
873				1					1	
880				1					1	
882				2, 2					1	
883				2					3	
885	y	ly	1, 2	2	ly0				2	
886			1, 2	2	ly0				2	
889				1					2	
891				1					2	
892	y	3y		2, 3, 4					2	
901				2, 3, 4, 5, 6	3y0		1		5	

[illegible]

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